The co-author of an article defending the conjugal view of marriage takes issue with some critics for suggesting his arguments are rooted in prejudice rather than principles. He, of course, takes himself to be offering a principled argument in defense of a view of marriage that excludes homosexuals. He writes:
No serious philosopher would deny, in so many words, that to demonize opponents is to betray the vocation of philosophy. But some academic philosophers are so bound to the cause of redefining civil marriage that they would marginalize dissenters with epithets and analyze them as specimens of psychological pathology. Chappell, though he goes on to ask serious questions, is at pains to deny that he deems our argument worth engaging. For him, it is, like misogyny, merely unreasonable, subrational, and bigoted. Linking to Chappell’s critique, Brian Leiter repeats the charge and presumes to diagnose us.
Are philosophers necessarily committed to respecting arguments in every instance? Suppose that in all seriousness some philosopher offers up a contemporary defense of Aristotle's argument in support of slavery or his views and gender-relationships. The philosopher goes on and on about how nature has marked out some people to be ruled rather than to rule. He goes on and on about how women have reason, but it has no authority. The author readily admits that this is contrarian position from the standpoint of modern sensibilities, but notes that those sensibilities are fairly new (historically speaking) and that many thinkers throughout the history of philosophy have espoused arguments in support of dicriminatory practices.
Are professional philosophers committed to taking these arguments seriously? Or, would it be reasonable - given the well known flaws of this very old line of reasoning, the inconsistency of its application by those that espouse it, then tendency of that application to work in favor of the person espousing it, its close ties to actual bigotry and forms of oppression, and the fact it's obviously contrary to other common place moral sensibilities - to dismiss the argument and suggest that the philosopher's argument maybe motivated by prejudice? Is Girgis going to take that argument seriously?
I don't take arguments for slavery seriously. And, I'm inclined to believe that those who might seriously espouse arguments in support of the institution of slavery are probably motivated by prejudice, even if they are able to present their arguments publicly without using derogatory language. I think the vocation of philosophy requires philosophers to treat arguments on the basis of their merits and in this regard the majority of professional philosophers seem to think that arguments for slavery as well as the conjugal view of marriage come up short.
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